Introduction
As is well known, optimal, welfare-based monetary policy, even in a flex-price, efficiently functioning economy, is subject to a time consistency problem if the government does not have lump-sum taxes or transfers at its disposal. This is because 'surprise' inflation may be a substitute source of non-distorting revenue, alleviating the problem of being unable to reach the first-best, 'Friedman Rule' outcome of a zero nominal interest rate. In this world, monetary policy must be implemented by open-market swaps of money and government debt, and the optimal second-best policy is to use debt to smooth intertemporally the distortions caused by inflation. Surprise inflation can help reduce these distortions.
Although this problem is familiar, significant puzzles about it remain. First is that the optimal monetary policy is likely to be degenerate, in that the best surprise rate of inflation to pick is infinity, because this maximises the lump sum of revenue appropriated by the government. Attention was drawn to this feature by Lucas and Stokey (1983) . However, a well-defined optimum can be obtained if money enters the economy in such a way that there is a welfare cost of current inflation, since this cost must then be balanced against the benefits. This feature was introduced in an interesting contribution by Nicolini (1998) . The presence of the cost, on the other hand, leads to a second puzzle: it may now be the case that the time consistency problem takes the form of an incentive to create surprise deflation (i.e. inflation lower than expected). This inverts all our usual ideas about time inconsistency in monetary policy. A third puzzle arises if we assume policy is conducted under discretion, rather than (as implicit in the discussion so far) under commitment. In this case lack of trust in the government's projected policy might be conjectured to lead to higher expected and actual inflation; but in fact it has been argued that discretion will lead in the long run to lower inflation -in particular to convergence to the Friedman Rule where inflation is negative.
Such an argument is presented in two papers by Obstfeld (1991 Obstfeld ( , 1997 . 1 In this paper we reconsider this optimal monetary policy problem. We do so using Nicolini's model of a simple cash-in-advance economy, thereby avoiding the first of the above-mentioned puzzles. We extend his analysis of the case of commitment a little, but our main contribution is to the case of discretion, which he did not study. The model enables us to conduct a pure welfare-based analysis of optimal policy under discretion, avoiding
Obstfeld's need to postulate an ad hoc objective function for the policymaker. Our analysis shows that the second and third of the above-mentioned puzzles are related. Specifically, we find that under discretion it is not necessarily true that in the long run the economy will converge on the Friedman Rule. Depending on consumer preferences, it may converge on a different steady state where inflation is above the Friedman-Rule level, and quite possibly positive. We call this the 'time-consistent steady state'. The force which makes such a steady state possible turns out to be the incentive which exists towards surprise deflation under commitment. This latter counteracts the more familiar incentive towards surprise inflation, and makes it possible that, under commitment, a critical level of inherited government debt exists such that the two incentives exactly cancel out, leading to no temptation to behave in a time-inconsistent manner. It transpires that this critical debt level is the same as the one associated with the 'time consistent steady state' to which the economy may converge under discretion.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the economy. We examine optimal monetary policy under commitment in Section 3. In Section 4 we study optimal monetary policy under discretion, providing both analytical results and numerical computations. Section 5 concludes.
The Structure of the Economy
The economy consists of many identical households who consume the single type of output good, supply a single type of labour, and hold money -motivated by a cash-inadvance constraint -and bonds. Markets are perfectly competitive and all prices are flexible.
The government issues money and bonds. Bonds are taken to be 'real', or indexed, as in the papers already cited.
2 A key constraint on the government is that it does not have access to lump-sum taxes and transfers: the money supply must be changed through open market operations, i.e. purchases or sales of bonds in exchange for money. Since our focus is purely on monetary policy, we shall ignore conventional distorting taxes, and treat government spending on goods and services as exogenous.
Technology takes the form y t = n t , where y t is output and n t is labour input. Hence competitive firms will set a price equal to the wage, and make zero profits. For the representative household, the optimisation problem is:
(1 )
M t ,b t are, respectively, the quantities of money and real bonds held at the start of period t; R t is the nominal interest rate between t-1 and t; c t is consumption; n t is labour supply; and p t is the price level. The key feature of this problem is that M 0 and b 0 are given. In this way the model incorporates a 'welfare cost of current inflation': a rise in p 0 (and equal proportional rise in all p t , t > 0) depresses the real value of the household's initial cash holdings, so that (provided the cash-in-advance constraint is binding) current consumption is squeezed. This liquidity squeeze occurs because the household is assumed to be unable to visit the asset market at the start of the period: in any period, goods markets open before asset markets.
Such a timing assumption was introduced by Svensson (1985) , and is the reverse of the more common timing assumption in cash-in-advance models associated with Lucas (e.g. Lucas (1982) ). Its value in the present context is that it captures the idea that current inflation has a cost because agents cannot instantaneously adjust their portfolios.
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From the first-order conditions for the household's problem we can readily derive:
(in which it has been assumed that R t > 0, so that the cash-in-advance constraint binds). (3) indicates that the real interest rate is a constant equal to the inverse subjective discount rate.
The nominal interest rate thus moves one-to-one with the expected inflation rate. (2) indicates that consumption is uniquely and negatively related (since U′′ < 0) to the nominal interest rate, or equivalently to the expected inflation rate. This reflects the distorting effect of the inflation tax: the earnings from an increase in current labour supply cannot be spent immediately, owing to the cash-in-advance constraint, and their future value is hence eroded by expected inflation, which therefore provides a disincentive to labour supply and so to consumption. Writing m t ≡ M t /p t , we note that m t = c t provided that the cash-in-advance constraint binds, which reminds us that expected inflation equivalently reduces the demand for real balances.
Equilibrium in the private sector of the economy may now be determined. At this point, suppose an arbitrary monetary policy defined by a sequence of monetary growth rates,
. Then equilibrium consumption must satisfy:
which has been obtained from (2) 
This is the government's intertemporal budget constraint expressed in terms of 'cash-flow seigniorage', i.e. µ t m t . We may also re-write it as: 
Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment
In this section we assume that there is some commitment mechanism which obliges the government to adhere to the monetary policy which it chooses in period 0, 
We have substituted out R t using (2), m t using m t = c t , and n t using the production function and (5). It is clear that, rather than treat the µ t 's as the control variables, we can equivalently treat the c t 's as the control variables, leaving the µ t 's to be determined residually by the difference equation constraints. This reduces the problem to:
We easily see that this problem has an unconstrained maximum where:
This is the first-best, 'Friedman Rule' solution, where R t = 0. The government's intertemporal budget constraint in general prevents the attainment of this outcome unless initial government debt is sufficiently negative. Thus, in a second-best situation, c t will be less than its
Friedman-Rule level, and an optimal policy must trade off the deviation of c t from this with the deviation of any other c s .
It is straightforward to derive the following set of first-order conditions for the problem (10):
Here, σ(c t ) is the 'relative risk aversion' measure of curvature of U(c t ), i.e. ( ) / ( )
It is immediate from this that c t is the same for all t = 1,...,∞. It is further apparent that this common c t (≡ c, say) is in general different from c 0 . Hence an optimal time path of c t typically takes the form of either a 'step up' or a 'step down' (see Figure 1 ). Inspection of (12) further shows that if σ < 1 then we obtain c 0 < c (a 'step up'), and if σ > 1 then we obtain c 0 > c (a 'step down'). In the special case where σ = 1, the optimal time path is 'flat'.
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The above results are as in Nicolini (1998) . Nicolini however restricts attention to utility functions of the 'constant relative risk aversion' (CRRA) class, so that σ is an exogenous parameter. Here we will explore the consequences of more general utility (12) and evaluating where c 0 = c = c c , we obtain:
This is clearly less than or greater than one as σ′(c c ) is (respectively) positive or negative.
That is, the expansion path cuts the 45 o line from above if the relative risk aversion parameter is increasing in consumption at the intersection point, and from below if it is decreasing. exists, and where it occurs from above. In this case there must also exist a critical value of (1+R 0 )b 0 such that, if initial debt happened to take this value, the optimal policy would be to choose c 0 = c = c c . The associated budget constraint is the one which passes through the point C. If initial debt were slightly higher than this level, the budget constraint would lie slightly farther to the left, and the optimum would be at a point like A, where c 0 < c. Conversely if 6 The condition for this is that the RHS of (12) be decreasing in c. It turns out that the same condition is necessary for the optimisation problem's second-order conditions to be satisfied, so we need this condition to hold. It holds provided that σ(c) is increasing, constant, or not too strongly decreasing, in c.
7 (14) is not the correct expression for the slope at the Friedman-Rule point. The slope there is instead given simply by σ, and so is greater or less than one as σ is greater or less than one.
initial debt were slightly lower, the optimum would be at a point like B, where c 0 > c. In the case in Figure 2 , then, the shape of the optimal time path of consumption depends on the initial level of debt: 'high' debt gives rise to a 'step up' shape, and low debt to a 'step down'
shape. With the CRRA utility function used by Nicolini (1998) , on the other hand, the expansion path lies either always above, or always below, the 45 o line, and the magnitude of initial government debt is therefore irrelevant, qualitatively speaking, to the shape of the optimum time path of consumption.
In order to assess whether there is a potential time consistency problem with the optimal policy, it must be compared with the optimal policy if the government were permitted to reoptimise in period 1. This re-optimisation is only hypothetical, since we have assumed that there is a commitment mechanism to prevent the government from actually deviating from its period-0 plan. Let us denote the optimal choice of c t from the perspective of period s (s ≤ t) as | t s c . We are particularly interested in whether 1|1 c is smaller or greater than 1|0 c . Since
c indicates that the government in period 1 would wish to set p 1 higher than was planned in period 0, i.e. that there is an incentive to 'surprise inflation'. Conversely, if 1|1 c > 1|0 c , the incentive is to 'surprise deflation'. Following
Nicolini's method we may readily show that, if the period-0 optimal time path takes the form of a 'step up', then in period 1 there is an incentive to surprise inflation; while if it takes the form of a 'step down', then in period 1 there is an incentive to surprise deflation. A summary sketch of the two possible relationships between the period-0 and period-1 optimal time paths for consumption is thus as in Figure 1 .
Together with the earlier results, this then implies that if there exists a critical consumption level (strictly less than the Friedman Rule level) at which the coefficient of 'relative risk aversion' in consumption equals one, then associated with this is a critical level of government debt such that, if initial debt happens to take this value, there is no time inconsistency. Moreover, if relative risk aversion is increasing (decreasing) in consumption at the critical level, then initial debt above the critical debt level will be associated with a temptation to create surprise inflation (deflation); and initial debt below, with a temptation to create surprise deflation (inflation). This is an extension of Nicolini's (1998) We hence conclude that the preferences required in order for the above result to apply are not especially unusual. It is true that CRRA preferences are widely used in macroeconomics, partly because they have the convenient property of being consistent with balanced growth.
However, quadratic preferences are also widely used in consequence of some other convenient properties: for example, in the presence of uncertainty they generate the exact consumption-as-a-random-walk result, and they underpin mean-variance portfolio analysis.
In the present paper our aim is to explore the implications of some familiar utility functions as a theoretical exercise, rather than to claim any one function fits the facts well. Clearly 8 A referee points out that, in an extension to his main analysis, Nicolini (1998) also notes that there may be a critical level of initial debt such that there is no temptation to time inconsistency. This is where σ > 1 and debt is nominal. Nominal debt generates an incentive towards surprise inflation which could exactly offset the incentive towards surprise deflation. However Nicolini does not develop the analysis of this case. 9 This condition ensures that ĉ /2 is less than the Friedman-Rule consumption level, ĉ -α. If it is violated, the expansion path lies everywhere above the 45 o line. Even though quadratic utility by itself does not therefore guarantee an expansion path like that in Figure 2 , we can still say that, with quadratic utility, if an incentive to surprise deflation is ever to exist (i.e. if part of the expansion path is ever to lie below the 45 o line), then a critical consumption level as defined in the main text must also exist. much more elaboration of our bare-bones model would be needed before it could be confronted with the data.
A further natural question concerns why the direction of time inconsistency should depend on the size of σ. As noted, in a CIA model with Lucas's timing assumption, the temptation to 'cheat' in monetary policy is always towards surprise inflation. In the present framework, the incentive to raise all current and future prices equiproportionally in order to appropriate revenue in a 'non-distorting' way is counterbalanced by the incentive not to generate a large welfare cost of current inflation through the liquidity-squeeze mechanism explained earlier. The direction of the temptation to cheat depends on how these incentives change, relative to the incentives for the setting of subsequent periods' inflation, as time advances. First, observe that a temptation to reduce current inflation relative to what was planned would arise if an increase in current inflation (increase in p 0 /p -1 , from the perspective of period 0) were to provide a smaller gain in the PV of seigniorage and a larger loss of lifetime utility 10 than a projected increase in future inflation (increase in p 1 /p 0 , from the perspective of period 0). This is because, when the future 'arrives', the seigniorage benefit would be smaller than it was from the vantage point of the period before and the utility cost would be larger, so the government would perceive an incentive to deviate downwards from what it had planned. Such changes in incentive occur when σ > 1 because future consumption demand is then inelastic with respect to future inflation (or, equivalently, 1+R t ), as can be seen from (2); while current consumption demand is always unit-elastic with respect to current inflation, as follows from the cash-in-advance constraint. Hence a 1-unit increase in p 0 /p -1 causes a larger loss of lifetime utility than a (1/β)-unit increase in p 1 /p 0 . It also causes a smaller gain in the PV of seigniorage, because the inelastic future consumption demand means a weaker dampening effect on revenue of the shrinkage in the tax base as the inflation rate is raised, so that seigniorage increases more strongly with future than with current inflation.
Optimal Monetary Policy Under Discretion
If the government is unable to commit to a given policy plan made in period t,
= , then it is not rational for households' forecasts of future µ t+s 's, as of time t (denote these by | e t s t µ + ), to equal those in the plan. Instead, forecasts should be based only on variables observable at time t. The government's inherited stock of debt is one obvious 'observable' on which to condition forecasts, since it is clear from the previous section that initial debt is a key determinant of the government's optimal policy choices. Other observables could also be used, such as current and past values of µ t . However, this would introduce an element of 'reputation-building' behaviour into policy. Since we wish to focus on purely 'discretionary' behaviour, we use only debt as the basis for private forecasts.
Formally, the concept of equilibrium employed will be that of Markov-perfect equilibrium.
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First, it is useful, as Obstfeld does, to define the concept of government 'commitments' 0 (1 )
'Commitments' is just the spending, in present-value terms, over which the government does not have discretion. Formally, we will use k t rather than debt as the state variable in what follows, although, given our assumption that g is time-invariant, k t is simply debt plus the constant, g/(1-β). Note that the government's budget constraint in terms of k t is (cf. (6)):
We now suppose that, in period t, households forecast (µ t+1 ,k t+2 ) using the rules: 
11 This is the same basic idea as in Obstfeld (1991 Obstfeld ( , 1997 . His 1991 paper studies a small open economy version of the optimal inflation tax smoothing problem, while his 1997 paper does the same for a closed economy. The key difference from the present analysis, as noted in the Introduction, is that Obstfeld's model does not include a 'welfare cost of current inflation'. This obliges him to use a government objective function which differs from the private utility function, being obtained by adding on an ad hoc 'cost of current inflation' term to the latter. ψ .
These forecasting rules can next be used to determine equilibrium consumption in period t. Recall that the equilibrium value of c t is given by the private-sector law of motion, 
(21) reveals that the government's dynamic optimisation problem under discretion -unlike that under commitment -has a standard recursive form. That is, every period, the new value of the state (k t+1 ) depends only on the current value of the state (k t ) and on the current value of the control (µ t ), while the flow maximand also depends only on these same two variables (although it is k t+1 which appears in the flow maximand, k t+1 is an implicit function of (k t ,µ t ) via the constraint). This structure means that the problem can in principle be solved by dynamic programming. In turn, dynamic programming ensures that the solution is time consistent.
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The dynamic programming perspective also makes clear that the solution to our problem can be expressed as a pair of feedback rules on the state; for example 
The first-order conditions for this are then easily derived:
Repeating here the constraint from the problem (24), 
we see that (25)-(26) constitute a first-order dynamical system in (k t ,c t ), which determines the evolution of the economy under the optimal discretionary policy. Given that k t is a predetermined variable whereas c t is not, c 0 will generally be tied down in relation to k 0 by the transversality condition. This hence determines a particular solution of the system (25)-(26) which constitutes the solution of the optimisation problem. We denote this solution as:
Equivalently, (27) is the optimal feedback rule of the control upon the state variable. If the optimum is such that the economy converges on a steady state, then (27) is also the 'saddlepath' solution of (25)-(26).
Although (.)
θ , like e(.), is still at present an unknown function, once it has been determined we can substitute it back into (26) to get:
This implicitly determines the optimal feedback rule for k t+1 , (23). The optimal feedback rule for µ t , (22), is similarly recoverable by substituting (27) and (23) We now aim to study the properties of the discretionary equilibrium. We start with the steady states. Inspection of (25) suggests two ways in which a stationary solution of the dynamical system (25)- (26) may occur. First, (25) is clearly satisfied at the Friedman Rule,
where U′ -α = 0 for all t. We shall refer to this as the 'Friedman Rule steady state' (FRSS), It is intuitively clear that if initial government debt is sufficiently negative that the underlying 'second-best' problem is absent, then time inconsistency is removed, and a government which started in this fortunate position would have no incentive to move away from it.
Obstfeld (1991, 1997) similarly identifies the Friedman Rule allocation as a steady state of the discretionary equilibrium in his analysis. However, whereas for Obstfeld the Friedman Rule allocation is the only steady state, this is not necessarily true here. A second way in which a stationary solution of (25) could occur is if there exists a k t+1 at which e′(k t+1 ) = 0.
More specifically, we might conjecture that this would be true at the value of k t+1 corresponding to the 'critical' debt level as we defined it for monetary policy under commitment. The motivation for such a conjecture is that we know from Section 3 that there is no time inconsistency if initial debt happens to equal the critical value, and that, under commitment, if the government started with this amount of debt it would choose to stay there.
Thus it might be hypothesised that, with this critical amount of initial debt, the optimal policy under discretion would be the same as under commitment. This second type of steady state we shall refer to as the 'time consistent steady state' (TCSS).
To prove that a TCSS exists under discretion if, in the problem under commitment, there exist critical consumption and debt levels as defined in Section 3, consider again the definition of the function e(.) (given in (20)). Differentiating this function with respect to k, we obtain: The level of inflation at the TCSS is higher than the negative inflation rate (β-1) which prevails at the Friedman Rule. Its value depends on the utility function: from (2) and (3) follows that the long-run destination of the economy under discretion is not necessarily a situation of deflation. We may also note that the level of debt at the TCSS is higher than the negative level required to sustain the Friedman Rule, and the same is true of the level of commitments. Whether they are negative or positive in the absolute again depends on the utility function, and also on g.
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The evolution of the economy under discretion is governed by (23), which we saw to take its form implicitly from (28). Differentiating (28), and evaluating at a generic steady state k, we have:
Local convergence to either the FRSS or the TCSS clearly requires that -1 < ψ′ < 1. order to determine whether this condition can be satisfied. An expression for e′ has already been obtained in (29) . Differentiating (29) for a second time yields the following expression for e′′, which will be useful below:
In order to find an expression for θ ′ , recall that ( ) t k θ is the saddlepath solution of the dynamical system (25)- (26). By taking a linear approximation to this system about a steady state, we may find an expression for θ ′ . Such a calculation yields:
We now observe that (29), (31) and (32) constitute a system of three simultaneous equations in the four unknowns ( , , , ) e e θ θ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ . Although we cannot solve it as it stands, if we proceed to evaluate it at either the FRSS or TCSS, it turns out that we obtain additional restrictions which are sufficient to make solution possible.
Consider first the local dynamics of the FRSS. Setting U′ = α, notice that e′′ drops out of (32). (29) and (32) then constitute a system of two equations in just two unknowns, e′ and θ′, from which we may hope to solve for e′ and θ′. Appendix A presents the relevant calculations. We show that the system can be reduced to a quadratic equation in θ′ as the single unknown. Once θ′ has been determined, e′ follows from (29) and ψ′ from (30). Since the quadratic implies two possible solutions for θ′, there are also two possible solutions for e′ and ψ′. The point of particular interest is whether either of the solutions for ψ′ have absolute value less than one. The key result demonstrated in Appendix A is that if σ < 1, there is exactly one solution for ψ′ with absolute value less than one; but if σ > 1 there are no solutions with absolute value less than one. Combining this with our earlier finding, we thus conclude that: In the case σ < 1 we also find, more specifically, that ψ′ lies in (0,1) (ensuring that convergence is monotonic), and that θ′ and e′ are negative. Thus, as the Friedman Rule is approached, debt steadily falls (or equivalently -once debt becomes negative -government assets steadily rise) and consumption steadily rises. Inflation also steadily falls (becomes more negative). This is the outcome obtained by Obstfeld (1991 Obstfeld ( , 1997 . 
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A numerical illustration of a set of discretionary equilibria (one for each initial value of k t ) converging on the FRSS is given in Figure 3 . This is calculated for the CRRA utility 14 To see this, note that since θ′ is negative, and recalling that θ′ = θ ′ , a reduction in k t+1 raises private agents' forecasts of c t+1 . c t+1 is negatively related to expected inflation p t+1 /p t by (2)-(3). 15 Although, under this outcome, utility is higher in the long run under discretion than under commitment, lifetime utility from the perspective of period 0 is lower, because consumption in the short run can be shown to be lower. This is as it should be, because inability to commit acts as a constraint on the optimal policy. This suggests that in this case the destination may instead be the time-consistent steady state, where the latter exists.
We now turn to the local dynamics of the TCSS. At the TCSS itself, σ = 1 and e′ = 0, as shown previously. Hence θ′′ drops out of (31), and the simultaneous system of (29), (31) and (32) can be reduced to the system of just (31) and (32) As Proposition 2 emphasises, in the neighbourhood of the critical consumption level there is a close relationship between the optimal policy under commitment and that under discretion. Moreover, in the case where under commitment a temptation to surprise inflation is associated with debt above the critical level and vice versa (i.e. in the case where σ′ > 0), we can show that 0 < ψ′ < 1, thus ensuring that convergence under discretion is monotonic;
and we can also show that θ′ and e′′ are negative. If k 0 > k c , consumption then steadily rises over time until it reaches the critical level. Along this path, inflation and debt are falling. If, on the other hand, k 0 < k c , then consumption steadily falls over time, with accompanying rises in debt and inflation. By comparison, under commitment, paths with the same k 0 would involve a rise or a fall in consumption (respectively) between periods 0 and 1, and a corresponding fall or rise in debt during period 0, but they would not continue all the way to (c c ,k c ). The reason why the evolution is carried further under discretion is that e′ < 0 at k 0 > k c and e′ > 0 at k 0 < k c , as follows from the fact that e′′ < 0 at the TCSS. e′ < 0 means that there is an 'Obstfeld effect', as described above, so that the government perceives additional benefits of debt decumulation when unable to commit. e′ > 0, by contrast, implies that there is a 'reverse Obstfeld effect': now a marginal increase in end-of-period debt raises current consumption through the effect on agents' expectations, giving the government an incentive to accumulate debt relative to the case in which it can commit. Intuitively, e′ > 0 here because this is the region of k 0 in which, under commitment, the temptation is to create surprise deflation. In this region, for a government following the optimal committed policy, after one period the higher debt which it faces would create an incentive for it to choose consumption to be greater than in the plan: under discretion, this incentive is reflected in the way debt influences consumption through expectations. ) we also plot the two consumption levels which result from the problem under commitment (cf. Figure 3) . We see that while, for debt above k c , consumption in the short run is lower under discretion than commitment, for debt below k c the opposite is true.
Our results demonstrate the main claim made in the Introduction, which is that it is not inevitable that under discretion the optimal policy will converge on the Friedman Rule. As we have just argued, the force which may prevent the attainment of the Friedman Rule, or even drive the economy away from it, is the fact that under commitment there can be an incentive to surprise deflation rather than surprise inflation.
It may be remarked that, although the conditions for local convergence to the FRSS and 
Conclusions
Our main findings having been summarised in the Introduction, we here comment on their generality. First, it is not essential to the results that we have used a cash-in-advance framework. A common alternative is the money-in-the-utility function approach. If this is adopted, then, in order to capture a welfare cost of current inflation, an analogous modelling device to the use of 'Svensson's timing' in cash-in-advance is to use beginning-of-period nominal balances deflated by the current price as the real balances variable in the utility function (as is done, in a different application, by Neiss (1999) ). In early work we employed such an approach and obtained results which exactly parallel those presented here. In fact, it can be shown that the two approaches are mathematically equivalent. However the interpretation required of the functions is different: what matters in the money-in-the-utility function approach is the shape of the utility-of-real-balances function, rather than the shape of the utility-of-consumption function.
Second, the precise conditions which we have obtained in this paper for a timeconsistent steady state of the discretionary equilibrium to exist, and for convergence to it to be possible, are ones which we would not expect to be robust to other ways of modelling the welfare cost of current inflation. The way the latter is represented here is simple and convenient but there are more sophisticated ways in which it could be captured, such as in the 'limited participation' models referred to earlier. Nevertheless we would still expect that a 'time-consistent steady state', as we have defined it, could occur in such models, albeit with modifications to the exact conditions for its existence. Hence we anticipate that our conclusion that optimal monetary policy under discretion does not necessarily converge on the Friedman Rule would still apply in more general models. If σ < 1, the first test parameter is negative, so there is exactly one root with absolute value less than one. (From the foregoing, we can moreover say that this root must be positive.) If σ > 1, the first test parameter is positive, and the second is also positive, so there are no roots with absolute value less than one. These are the results asserted in the main text.
Having seen that when σ < 1 there exists a ψ′ ∈ (0,1), it follows from (A3) that the associated θ′ and e′ are negative, as also asserted in the main text.
B. Dynamics in the neighbourhood of the time-consistent steady state
As noted in the main text, setting σ = 1 and e′ = 0 causes θ′′ to drop out of (31), so that (31) and (32) then constitute a system of two equations in the two unknowns e′′ and θ′. Using (31) to substitute e′′ out of (32) and re-arranging, we obtain a cubic equation in θ′. However, 
as referred to in the main text.
Rather than study the implications of this for θ′, it is of greater interest to study its implications for ψ′. Using e′ = 0 in (30) we have ψ′ = (1+θ′)/β. This enables us to re-express (B1) as a quadratic equation in ψ′:
say. This function is approximated numerically on a grid, and the maximisation operation described on the RHS of the Bellman equation is carried out by a grid search routine. In this way a new value function, V 1 (k t ), is generated. The process is then repeated N times until the function has converged, as judged by an appropriate criterion of convergence.
In our case, however, e(k t+1 ) is an unknown, endogenous function. It must satisfy (20) 
